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IDENTIFICATION AND VALUATION OF ASSETS
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
ALAN M. GROSMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid developments in the laws regarding equitable
distribution of property on divorce have occurred in the legislative
and judicial halls of most states during the past decade. These far-
reaching statutory and judicial changes in the laws governing the
division of marital property have been designed to provide
improved methods of adjusting the financial aspects of the marital
relationship upon divorce. While some of the many complex issues
involved in a fair division of marital assets have been handled
differently in different jurisdictions, a consensus on end-results is
emerging throughout the country. This consensus is being achieved
despite substantial theoretical differences in starting points.
The momentous changes that have been occurring can be
traced to fundamental changes in American society. These include
the following: changes in the family, particularly with the higher
*Member in firm of Grosman & Grosman, Newark, New jersey: B.A., 1956, Weslevan
University; M.A., 1957, Yale University; J.D.. 1965, New York Law School: Fellow, American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers; Past Chairman, Family Law Committee, Essex County Bar
Association.
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incidence of divorce; changes in the economic status of women;
increases in population mobility; new perceptions of the nature of
marriage and divorce; and, especially, increases in recognition of
the contributions of the wife as a homemaker and to the career of
the husband.1
As a result, courts have been finding that such items as the
good will of a closely held corporation and medical, dental, and law
practices, as well as profit-sharing plans and pension rights are
subject to equitable distribution on divorce.
These developments have, in turn, substantially expanded the
roles and the responsibilities of the family law practitioner who
must now consider such non-traditional areas as taxation, 2
valuation of assets of all kinds,' corporate law, and accounting.
These developments have also substantially increased the
practitioner's malpractice exposure. 4
The several states take three basic approaches to the division
of marital assets upon divorce. 5 The first is the community property
approach. There are nine community property jurisdictions, 6 but
they differ substantially among themselves in the distribution of
community property. This has been described as follows:
Traditionally, fault has been important as to [the]
amount of distribution or as a bar to distribution. Except
in California, Arizona and Washington, and in some
cases in Louisiana, marital misconduct may decrease or
eliminate the guilty party's share of community property
1. When the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's 1971
equitable distribution law in Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974), it observed:
It gives recognition to the essential supportive role played by the wife in the home.
acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled to a
share of family assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus the division of property
upon divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint
undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.
Id. at 228-29, 320 A.2d at 501.
2. For an excellent analysis of federal tax aspects of equitable distribution, see DuCanto. Yhe
Federal Tax Treatment of Transfers of "Marital Property" under the Neu, Illinois Marrge & Dissolution of
Marrtage Act, 59 CH. BAR REC. 286-90 (1978). Seegenerally AM, FAM. TAx L. RF., published monthly
since.July 1978.
3. See generally Dividing the Pie, Putting a Price on a Divorcing Couple's Assets. 2 FAM. ADvoc. 1-44
(1979).
4. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589 (1975), in which an
attorney was held liable to his client for malpractice in the sum of $100,000 for not, in 1967,
researching and arguing the then-open question of whether federal military retirement pay was
divisible marital property. SeeAnnot. 78 A.L.R.3d 255 (1977).
5. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the 50States. An Overview as of 1978, 13 Fam. L. Q. 105-28 (1979).
6. Id. at 116. The community property jurisdictions are as follows: Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, Texas, and Washington. Id.
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distribution. In California, Louisiana and Washington,
there normally is an equal division of the community. In
the other community property states there is an equitable
distribution. '
The second approach utilizes traditional common-law title
concepts to distribute marital assets solely on the basis of title.
Seven states follow the common-law title theory.8 In these states the
spouse with title to the property prior to the divorce retains title
after the divorce. The courts in these states have no general or
equitable power to distribute property, except as regards
constructive trusts and the tracing of equitable title.
The third and most prevalent approach today is the common-
law method that permits an equitable distribution of property. In
jurisdictions that use this approach, the courts do have the power to
equitably distribute property on divorce. 9 In some of these
common-law equitable distribution jurisdictions only property
acquired during the marriage may be distributed, but in other
jurisdictions premarital separate property may be distributed.
North Dakota has historically provided for an "equitable
distribution of the real and personal property of the parties" on
divorce. 10 Thus, equitable distribution did not come to North
Dakota as a dramatic development of the seventies, as it did to
several other common-law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the meaning
of the general language in the North Dakota statute has been
expanded and clarified in recent years, undoubtedly in response to
the underlying changes in American society.11 It can be anticipated
that this process will continue.
In many jurisdictions, the trial judge follows a three step
approach designed to enable him to make an equitable distribution
7. 1d.
8. Id. at 117. These states are as follows: Florida, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee (may equitably distribute jointly held property), Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
9. Id. These jurisdictions are as follows: Alabama (as to alimony only), Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia (as to alimony only), Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland (court can make a monetary award,
but cannot change title to property), Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina (as to alimony only), North Dakota, Ohio
(as to alimony only), Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee
(may equitably distribute jointly held property), Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
10. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-05-24 (1971). The origins of this statute date to 1877, but the words
"equitable distribution of the real and personal property" first appear in the 1911 Session Laws at
chapter 184, § 4073. The statute in its present form is identical to N.D. REv. CODE S 14-0524 (1943).
11. See Hulberg s. Hultberg, 281 N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1979); Rudelv. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651
(N.D. 1979); Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1978); Bellon v. Bellon, 213 N.W.2d 376 (N.D.
1973); Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966); Fleck v. Fleck, 79 N.D. 561, 58 N.W.2d
765 (1953); and Ruffv. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952).
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of marital assets. First, he must decide what specific property of
each spouse is subject to equitable distribution. Second, he must
determine its value for purpose of equitable distribution. Finally he
must decide on the most equitable allocation of the property. In
order for the judge to effectively perform these tasks, the
cooperation of counsel is required to fully and completely present
the parties' financial picture. This often requires the expert
testimony of appraisers and accountants.
The purpose of this article is to focus on two key equitable
distribution issues, namely, identification of the assets to be
included or excluded by courts for purposes of equitable
distribution and consideration of some of the problems related to
valuation of these assets.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF ASSETS
A. THE DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF AN EQUITABLE PROPERTY
DIVISION
Typically, equitable distribution statutes leave a great deal of
discretion to the trial court and contain no express statutory
commands for the amount or percentage of ailocations which courts
should make in equitable distribution awards. A brief look at some
equitable distribution statutes will illustrate this point.
The North Dakota statute provides that, "[w]hen a divorce is
granted, the court shall make such equitable distribution of the real
and personal property of the parties as may seem just and
proper."12 North Dakota has developed the Ruff-Fischer
guidelines 13 to aid the trial court in exercising its sound discretion
in the division of property. The Ruff-Fischer guidelines direct the
trial court, when determining the question of division of property
between the parties, to consider the following:
[T]he respective ages of the parties to the marriage; their
earning ability; the duration of and conduct of each
during the marriage; their station in life; the
circumstances and necessities of each; their health and
12. N D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971).
13. See Hultberg v. Hultberg, 281 N.W.2d 569.572 (N.D. 1979): Rudcl v. Rudel. 279 N.W.2d
651. 654 (N.D. 1979). These guidelines were adopted from Ruff%. Ruff. 78 N.D. 775. 52 N.W.2d
107 (1952), and Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966).
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physical condition; their financial circLnmtances as shown
by the property owned at the time, its Valuc at the time.
its income-producing capacity, if any. and whether
accumulated or acquired before or after the marriage...
and such other matters as may be material. 14
Furthermore, the findings of a trial court relating to the division of
property will not be overturned unless "clearly erroneous." 5
The New Jersey statute provides as follows:
Where a judgment of divorce. . . is entered the court may
make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to
alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable
distribution of the property, both real and personal,
which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or
either of them during the marriage. 1 6
In New.Jersey, "the trial judge must in each case regard all of the
particular circumstances of the individuals before the court, and
having weighed and evaluated them reach a determination as to
how best to fulfill the mandate of the statute."' 7 One circumstance
that is not an appropriate criterion for the trial judge to consider is
marital fault. 18
The Montana statute provides that in a proceeding for
divorce, legal separation, or a past divorce proceeding, the court
can "equitably apportion between the parties the property and
assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever
acquired" without regard to marital misconduct. ,9 The statute also
sets forth criteria that the court shall consider in making the
apportionment of property and assets. 20
14. HuhIr Huhbcrg, 281 N.W.2d 569. :72 i- I (N.D. 1979).
15. See Hultberg v. Hultiser g. 281 N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1979): Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2I 651
(N.). 1979): Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1978).
16. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1979). Interestingly, the North Dakota statute is one of
those s itcd by the New.Jersey Supreme Court in its decision in Paintir s. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 210.
320 A.2d 484, 491 (1974), construing the New Jersey equitah" (listrilution statute. See rgeneralr
Thompson, ANesss Jersey Equitable Distribution Statute Applied to Separation Agreements Erecuted Prior to
Statutes' Effective Date, 31 RUTGOERS L. REv. 76 (1978); NewJersey Decisions on Eligibility o/Assets for
Equitable )istribution, 79 DtcK. L. R v. 526 (1975).
17. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, _.320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974).
18. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, _320 A.2d 478. 482 (1974).
19. MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §48-321 (Supp. 1977).
20. Id. The ,criteria include the following:
ITJhe duration of the marriage. and prior marriage ofcither party, aretenuptia
tgres'ent of the paiics, the age, health, station, octpatieon, amount and sex.irces of
income. vouational skills. employatlility, estate, lialbilities, and needs of each of the
parties, sustsdial prosvisions, whther [sic the apportionment is in liu of' or in
addMiion to wnaihtsnanc,. and the opporit unity sf sCh fisr futtre tqtuisition of capital
205
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The 1977 Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
gives either spouse the right to a "just proportion" of the marital
property without regard to marital misconduct. 21 The statute
requires the court to consider all relevant factors and includes
criteria, similar to the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, to determine the
"justness" of the division. 22
The Wisconsin statute provides for a division of the property
of the parties on divorce, annulment or legal separation. There is a
statutory presumption that all property, other than inherited
property, is to be divided equally between the parties, but the court
may alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct
after considering a detailed list of criteria, similar to the Ruff-Fischer
guidelines, as well as "such other factors" as the court may in each
individual case determine to be relevant. 23
Alaska provides for equitable distribution "in the manner as
may be just, and without regard as to which of the parties is in
fault." ' 24 Colorado authorizes equitable distribution "in such
proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors." 25 Hawaii provides for a division "as shall appear just and
equitable." ' 26 The Iowa statute contains the language "as shall
be justified." 2  The Michigan statute reads, "as shall
assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of
value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as homemaker or to
the family unit.
ld.
21. i.iL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
22. Id. The criteria are as follows:
(1) ITIhe contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition.
preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital
property, including the contribution ofa spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
(2) tile value ofthe property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage:
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having custody
of the children:
(5) any obligations or rights arising from a prior marriage of either party:
(6) any antenuptial agreement ofthe parties;
(7) the age, health, station. occupation. amount and sources of income.
vocational skills. employability, estate, liabilities. and needs ofeach ofthe parties:
(8) the custodial provisions for any children:
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu ofor in addition to maintenance: and
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital
assets and income.
Id-
2:3. WIs. ST.T. ANN. § 247.255 (Supp. 1979).
24. AL.A K\ STAr.T 09.55.210 (6) (1962).
25. Coi. RF'. ST.T. § 14-10-13 (1974).
26. HA..WAIt Rev. STAT. § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1978).
27. los.s CoNF. ANN... 598.21 (Wet Supl,. 1979).
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appear just and reasonable.''28 The Vermont statutC providcs for
distribution "as shall appear just and cquitabhe. ' 2 ' ilhc New
Hampshire law reads "as may be decwd .just,'"'-t and the Orcgon
statute provides for distribution "as it may be just and
equitable.'' t The Massachusetts equitable (listrilbution law, which
took effect in 1974, provides that the court may, after taking into
account certain listed factors, assign to either spouse "all or any
part of the estate of the other. ",32
The most recent common-law (:onvert to equitabh" (list ribut ion
is Maryland, whose new provisions fir property division upon
divorce took effect January 1, 1979.' The Maryland statutc is
unique in that the court in a divorce or annulment may allocatc
assets acquired during the marriage by the grant of a monetary
award to the spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion
of the property acquired during the marriage. The court is not
authorized to change title to property under the new law, but the
power to make a monetary award may have that effect, since thc
sale of property may be necessary to satisfy the award. 34
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 35 has provided an
influential role in subsequent legislative enactments and in judicial
decisions, although- adopted in its entirety in very few states. The
28. MICH. COMi. LAws ANN..§ 552.23(1) (Supp. 1171).
29. VT. STAIr. ANN. I it . § 751 (1974).
30. N.H. R.v SiAT. ANN. §458:19 (1968).
31. OR. RFv.S',s'. 107.105(l)(c)(1977).
32. MAss. ( N. I,,ws ANN. i. 208, § 34 (Wcsl Supp. 1979). See Inkir, Walsh & I',ci hli.
Alimon, andA.svnv nent nfPropert,." The N w,, 'ltj i 'hene in Ala ai ¢hui t.s, It tAM. L ,. Q. 59-82 ( 1077).
33. MD. CTS. &.JU D. PRO:. d"oni- ANN. §3-6A-01 (Supp. 1979).
34. For . very inlcrsling and thorough disicussion of'hi new Maryland divorce- slaouc and |is
relation to those of othcr comamon-law jurisdicions with cquitabl, disiribotiun laws, ser Soprrtv
Divpovtion Upon DIvor-e in Alarvlanl" An Analvs. ofthe Net, Stalute, It U. BALTr. I. Ri-v. 377-410 ( 197!)
.35. UNiIORM MARr IA ,AND I)IVRt- Ac:-r § 307 cntains Aeiri-nativi A (design 'd fo
common-law sialis) and Aliernative B (designid fur (oinniniiy properly jurisdict ions), iih dealing
with quitable disltribution.
Ahternativc A provides as follows:
In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage. legal separation, or disposition of
property fllowing a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal separation bv a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spoisc or lacked jurisdliction to
dispose of the property, the court, without regard to marital misconduct, shall, and in
a proceeding fir legal separation may, finally equitably apportion between thi parties
the property and assets belonging to either or both huwevcr and whene'ir acquired.
and whithcr the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In making
ihe apportionment the court shall consider the duration of' the marriage, and prior
Marriage ofeither party, anienuptial agreement of hc parties. the age, health station.
ocupation, amount and sources of income, voational skills, emplisa-bilit', estali'.
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, cusiodial provisions, whithir lii'
apportionmenti is in lieu ofor in addition io mainmcnani'', and the opportunity ov i-am
fiur lutirit aquisition, preservation. ti'prc iai ion, or appriciation in "an' ofti "
rl'spect iv cstats. ,ind the iiintribulion ofl a spm sc as a lmamein akcr or to ilit' iiliilv
unit.
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jurisdictions that have adopted the major provisions of the Act are
Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, and Montana. The new
philosophy of equitable distribution is set forth in the introduction
to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in these terms:
The Act authorizes the division, upon dissolution, of
property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
(except for gifts and inheritances) as the primary means of
providing for the future financial needs of the spouses.
Where the marital property is insufficient for this
purpose, the Act provides that an award of maintenance
can be made to either spouse under appropriate
circumstances to supplement the available property. But,
because of its property division provisions, the Act does
not continue the traditional reliance upon maintenance as
the primary means of support for divorced spouses. 36
As these statutes illustrate, the extensive amount of discretion
afforded to the trial court to make an equitable distribution has
resulted in the attorney being quite limited in advising a client of'
the probable distribution of marital assets. This limit on
predictability has provided a great incentive to work out
settlements, in order to avoid the uncertainty of the court's reaction
to the particular facts of a case.
B. PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
As the language of the various equitable distribution statutes
suggests, different jurisdictions have somewhat dissimilar views
concerning what assets are subject to equitable distribution on
divorce.
The North Dakota equitable distribution law, like the New
.Jersey equitable distribution law, authorizes a division of property
between the parties only if a divorce is granted. 37 The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act authorizes equitable distribution in an
action for legal separation as well as an action for dissolution of a
marriage.3 8  The Wisconsin statute requires an equitable
distribution of property in cases of annulment, as well as in cases of
36. National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, Prfartrv Note. op. cit., 93.
37. See Painter v. Painter. 65 N.J 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Orwick v. Orwick. 153 N.W.2d
795 (N.D. 1967). Hoellinger v. Hoellinger. 38 N.D. 636, 166 N.W. 519 (1918). See Finnertv. The
Propet;' Distrihution Dieciion." AnAna/his, 97 NJ JL.J. 472. 483 (1974).
38. Seesupra note 35 for pertinent text of this Act.
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divorce or legal separation. 39
Under North Dakota law, real and personal property acquired
by either or both of the spouses prior to the marriage or during the
marriage is subject to equitable distribution on divorce. 40 In BelIon
v. Bellon, 41 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated as follows:
We said in Fischer v. Fischer. . that one of the factors to be
considered in a division of property between the parties in
a divorce action is whether the property was acquired before or
after the marriage. We have consistently held that in making
an equitable distribution the court shall consider all qf the
property of the parties both jointly and individually owned. 42
Similarly, in Fine v. Fine,43 the North Dakota Supreme Court
observed that:
while there may have been some confusion in the past as
to the jurisdiction of the court in a divorce action to award
the separate property of one spouse to the other. . ., it is
now well settled that the court has such power, even when
that separate property was acquired before the marriage.
The fact that property subject to distribution. . . was
acquired prior to marriage by one of the parties is a
consideration weighing in the spouse's favor, but it does
not prevent the court from awarding part or all of the
property to the other spouse should an equitable
distribution require it.44
Under New Jersey law premarital separate property is
generally excluded from equitable distribution because the statute
specifically limits equitable distribution to property acquired
"during the marriage. ,45
The New .Jersey courts have, however, dealt with premarital,
separate property that increased in value during the marriage. The
New Jersey Supreme Court initially held the following:
39. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40. See Fine %. Fine. 248 N.W .2d 838 (N.D. 1976): Bcllon v. Bellon. 237 N.W.2d 163 (N.D.
1976). Fischer %. Fischer, 139 N.XV.2d 845 (N.D. 1966): Fleck v. Fletk. 79 N.I). 561. 58 N.\V.2d
765 (153).
41. 237 N.W.2d 163 (N.D. 1976).
42. Bclin v. Belln. 237 N.\XV.2d 163, 165 (N.D. 1976) (emphasis added).
43. 248 N .2d 838 (N.D. 1976).
44. Fine \. Fine. 248 N.\V.2d 838. 840-41 (N.D. 1976).
45. NI. ST.\T. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1979).
209
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[If premarital separate property] later increases in value,
such increment enjoys a like immunity. Furthermore the
income or other usufruct derived from such property, as
well as any asset for which the original property may be
exchanged or into which it, or the proceeds of its sale,
may be traceable shall similarly be considered the
separate property of the particular spouse.
4 6
If, however, the separate or premarital property increases in
value during the marriage due to the efforts of the other spouse, the
increase does not enjoy a like immunity. 47 In Scherzer v. Scherzer,48
the husband owned fifty percent of the stock in a close corporation
prior to the marriage, as well as at the time of the divorce. The
value of the business had increased since the marriage due largely
to the husband's personal participation. The court held that the
wife was entitled to share in the post marital increased value of the
corporation to the extent that it was attributable to her efforts, even
though intangible. This holding is consistent with the underlying
theory of the e(quitable distribution statute that a wife contributes to
her husband's acquisition of wealth even if her contribution is in-
tangible. Later, in ,Vfol v. Mol,1° the court held that any increase in
value (luring the marriage in a husband's equity interest in real
estate acquired prior to the marriage, due solely to inflation or
other economic factors, was not subject to equitable distribution.5"
Thus. the case was remanded to determine that portion of growth
in value attributable to inflation or other economic factors, and that
portion of growth in value to which the wife contributed or for
which ihe" husband and wifl were jointly responsible.
C. PROPERTY ACQUIRED AFTER SEPARATION, BUT BEFORE
I)IVORCE
Property acquired after a separation, but before a divorce
merits important consideration to determine whether the property
should be subject to equitable distribution. The recent North
4(i. Piinrter '. Painler. 65 N..J 196. __ . 320 A.2d 484. 493 (1974).
47. Id, ad__ 320 A.2d at 493.
48. 136 N:. Super. 397. 346 A.2d 434 (App. Div. 1975). crti. denied, 69 N.J. 391. 354 A.2I 319
(1976).49, Scherzer v. Scherzer. 136 N.J. Super. 197. _ , 346 A.2d 434. 436 (App. Div. 1975).
50. 147 N.J. Super. 5,370 A.2d 509 (App. Div. 1977).
51. Mol v. Mol. 147 N.J. Super. 5. _ . 370 A.2d 509. 510 (App. Div. 1977).
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Dakota case of Keig v. Keig52 dealt with this question. In Keig, a doc-
tor created a $246,500 pension fund after he and his wife were
separated, but prior to their divorce. The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the fund was subject to equitable distribution and
stated, "[t]here is no more appearance of unfairness in holding
that property which (the husband) acquired while living sep-
arately is accountable to satisfy obligations which arose out of
the status of marriage, than requiring that post-divorce earnings be
used for post-divorce support or alimony payments."s5 The court
noted that while the wife may not have contributed to the ac-
cumulation of the pension fund per se, the record indicated that she
had contributed to the development of the medical practice by
working as a secretary and nurse in the husband's office during the
early years of the marriage.5 4 Thus, there was no error as a matter
of law.
In Weaver v. Weaver,5 5 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held
that property acquired after a separation agreement was not subject
to equitable distribution. 56 The property acquired by the husband,
a fund accumulated while he was a prisoner of war, subsequent to a
physical separation and separation agreement, was not jointly
acquired property, but was considered the separate property of the
husband. Although there was a separation agreement, the court did
not seem to consider it of primary importance. The court stressed
the permanent nature of the separation, and that the funds had
been acquired in a "time and manner" which indicated that the
wife did not contribute to the acquisition of the property. The court
indicated that if the fund had in any sense been acquired through
the joint industry of the parties, the funds would have been subject
to equitable distribution. 57
In Painter v. Painter58 the New Jersey Supreme Court took a dif-
ferent approach in determining what assets should be included or
excluded for purposes of equitable distribution. The court held that
all assets acquired from the date of the marriage to the date the
divorce complaint was filed were subject to equitable distribution. 59
This seemed to mean that all assets acquired during a period of
long separation prior to divorce, where it was clear that the
52. 270 N.W.2d 558 (1978).
53. Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (1978).
54. Id.
55. 545 P.2d 1305 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
56. Weaver v. Weaver, 545 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
57. Id.
58. 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
59. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484(1974).
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marriage had broken down, were nonetheless subject to equitable
distribution no matter how inequitable it might, in fact, turn out to
be. It also has meant that all assets acquired after the date the
divorce complaint was filed, including gifts and inheritances, were
excluded from equitable distribution, which was a considerable
comfort to many litigants and those who might wish to leave
inheritances or make gifts to litigants during this period.
The Painter rule, while seeming to provide a measure of cer-
tainty, has been criticized as being too mechanical and sometimes
leading to inequities. Two years later, in Smith v. Smith, 60 the New
Jersey Supreme Court limited the Painter rule when it held that
where a valid property settlement agreement had been executed
between the parties, assets acquired thereafter were not subject to
equitable distribution. 61
In the recent case of Brandenburg v. Brandenburg,62 the New Jer-
sey Appellate Divison further limited the Painter rule. In Brandenburg
the parties were married in 1944. They separated by mutual un-
derstanding in 1965 and remained separated until the divorce ac-
tion was instituted in 1975. During the ten-year separation the
husband acquired a stock interest. The court stated that if the
evidence was clear and unequivocal that the marriage was no
longer viable, property acquired after the marriage was factually
dead was not subject to equitable distribution. 63 If the breakdown
of the marriage was not established by clear and unequivocal
evidence, the rules of Painter and Smith were used. 64 The court fur-
ther stated:
We do not conceive that the equities dictated by the
facts of a particular case should be sacrificed on the altar
of vindication of a simplistic and uniform rule. There is
no reason why the determination of the appropriate
equities in a particular case should not be entrusted to the
good judgment of thejudiciary....
[Ilt is evident that an asset acquired by either
husband or wife after an unequivocal separation because
of a dead marriage should not be shared as a Windfall by
the other spouse. Should a member of the marriage part-
nership be frustrated or discouraged from bettering his or
60. 72 N.J. 350. 371 A.2d 1 (1977).
61. Smith v. Smith. 72 N.J. 350. _. 371 A.2d 1.7 (1977).
62. 167 N.J. Super. 256. 400 A.2d 823 (1979).




her economic status after a marriage in fact no longer
exists for fear of having the fruits of his or her endeavors
invaded merely because a divorce proceeding has not
been initiated or because the parties have been unable to
reach a consensual agreement? Or is it equitable for a
spouse to share in a gift or inheritance received by the
other spouse after the marriage is clearly at an end by vir-
tue of the unequivocal act of separation?
65
The court found that the marriage was factually dead, and,
therefore, the stock interest was not subject to equitable
distribution.
In California, a community property state, the issue of
whether property acquired after separation is a divisible com-
munity asset has been dealt with by statute. The law provides that
the "earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor child
living with or in the custody of the spouse, while living separate and
apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the
spouse. "66
The California courts have given a broad definition to
"accumulations" after separation. The term applies to any
property which a person acquires and retains except for property
the person exchanges for other community property or obtains with
community funds. 67 The court of appeals has interpreted this
statute to mandate that the date of separation determined the
extent of the community interest in property, and that property
acquired subsequent to the separation was the separate property of
the individual spouse. 68
The reference to community property concepts in regard to
this and other equitable distribution issues is made for an
important reason. In practice, common-law equitable distribution
jurisdictions have, as a matter of course, turned to precedents in
community property jurisdictions for guidance and authority in
dealing with the relatively new and unfamiliar equitable
distribution issues. 69 This practice has furthered the development
of the consensus about the division of marital property on divorce
65. Id.
66. CAL. CiV. Cony S 5118 (West 1971). See alro Goddard, A Report on Calzfornia's New Divorce
Law. Progress & Problems, 6 FAs. L. Q. 405-21 (1972).
67. In re Marriage of Wall, 29 Cal. App. 3d 76, 105 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1972): Union Oil Co. v.
Stewart, 158Cal. 149, 110 P.313 (1910).
68. In re Marriage of Smith, 56 Cal. App. 3d 247, 250, 128 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975); Kruger v. Kruger, 139
N.J. Super. 413, 419, 354 A.2d 340, 343-44 (App. Div. 1976), modified, 73 N.J. 464. 375 A.2d 659
(1977).
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that is emerging nationally.
North Dakota has a statute similar to the California statute. 70
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, has ruled that the
statute is not part of North Dakota's divorce law. 71 Thus, property
acquired after separation in North Dakota may be subject to
equitable distribution. 72
D. ASSETS SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
1. Gifts and Inheritances
Another issue concerning identification of assets subject to
equitable distribution is whether property acquired by gift or
inheritance during the marriage should be included or excluded.
The North Dakota courts seem to be deciding this issue on a case-
by-case basis. The recent case of Rudel v. Rude173 involved real estate
acquired by each of the spouses by gift and inheritance from their
respective families. The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's decision to first take from the marital estate the
property which each of the spouses had inherited and to award it to
each of them and then go on to consider a fair division of the
remaining assets. The court observed that in the prior case of Bellon
v. Bellon74 and Grant v. Grant75 "we declined to hold clearly
erroneous divisions of property made by trial courts which took into
account inherited property and awarded it or part of it to the party
who inherited it and thereafter divided. the balance of the marital
estate equally or substantially so.1"76 These cases reiterated that
findings by the trial court will not be overturned unless "clearly
erroneous. "77
Additionally, the court in Rudel stressed that an equitable
distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution. 78 This is the
prevailing view in most common-law equitable distribution states.
In community property states property acquired by gift or
inheritance is usually considered separate property and is not
70. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-07-08(2) (1971). The statute provides that, "the earnings and
accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living with her or in her custody, while she is
living separate from her husband, are the separate property ofthe wife. " Id.
71. Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1978).
72. Id. See supra note 53 and text referenced thereto.
73. 279 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1979).
74. 213 N.W.2d 376 (N.D. 1973).
75. 226 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1975).
76. Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651, 655 (N.D. 1979).
77. See supra note 15 and text referenced thereto.
78. 279 N.W.2d at 655.
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subject to distribution on divorce. 7 9 The rationale for exclusion of
gifts and inheritances from distribution in community property
states is that a gift or bequest to one spouse usually is unrelated to
the efforts or role of the other spouse and, in most cases, would
have been made regardless of the marriage relationship.
2. College or Professional Education
Several courts have examined whether a college or
professional education is an asset subject to distribution on divorce.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Graham, 80 found
that an education degree has none of the attributes of property and
is not marital property subject to distribution on dissolution. 81 The
court further stated:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply
not encompassed even by broad views of the concept of
''property." It does not have an exchange value or any
objective transferable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the
holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is
a cumulative product of many years of previous
education, combined with diligence and hard work. It
may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money.
It is simply an intellectual achievement that may
potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the
usual sense of that term. 82
The court did note that although one spouse's contribution to the
other spouse's education is not included in the pool of property
subject to distribution, the trial court may properly consider such
contribution to achieve an equitable distribution of the property
that is subject to distribution. 83
Similarly, in Stern v. Stern,84 the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the wife's argument that the earning capacity of her lawyer
79. See generalv W. DE FUNAK & M. VOtTGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed.
1971): POWELL. REAL PROPERTY S § 626-28 (1971).
80. __ Colo. __, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
81. In re Marriage ofGraham, __ Colo. -. 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
82. Id. at __574 P.2d at 77.
83. Id. at .574 P.2d at 78.
84.66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
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husband, one element of which was found to be his legal education,
be included as a separately identified and distinct item of property
subject to equitable distribution, even though the development of
this earning capacity had been aided and enhanced by the wife. 85
The court did note that the earning capacity was "doubtless a
factor to be considered by a trial judge in determining what
distribution will be 'equitable.' '',86
In Todd v. Todd,87 a California case, the court refused to
include a college and law school education, even though financed in
part by the other spouse, as a separate community asset subject to
distribution.
The Iowa Supreme Court recently found that the potential for
increase in future earnings made possible by a law degree conferred
upon the husband, with the aid of his wife, constituted an asset
subject to distribution.8 8 The court further held that,
a trial court in a dissolution case where proper evidence is
presented may consider the future earning capacities of
both parties and in determining those capacities it may
consider the education, skill or talent of both parties. This
statement of principle. . . applies to the court's
determination of an equitable distribution of assets and
property.... 89
In a recent Indiana case, McManama v. McManama,90 the court
affirmed an award to a wife of $3,600 in excess of the value of the
marital assets in recognition of her contribution to her husband's
legal education, as well as her contribution asihomemaker. 9t
3. Pensions and Prqfit-sharing Plans
Cases have been arising in many jurisdictions involving
different types of pensions and profit-sharing plans resulting in
differing views as to whether they should be included for purposes
of equitable distribution. In Keig v. Keig, 92 the North Dakota
85 Sternv. Stern. 66N.. 340. .331 A.2d 257. 260 (1975).
86. Id.
87. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786. __," 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969). Accord In re Marriage
of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). But .e Comment, The Interest of the
Community in a Professional Education. 10 CAL. WEST. L. Roy. 590(1974).
88. In re Marriage of Horstmann. 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978).
89. Id.
90. __ Ind. App. -, 386 N.E.2d 953 (1979).
91. McManama v. McManama, __ Ind. App. 386 N.E.2d 953. 955 (1979).
92. 270 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1978).
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Supreme Court included a medical profit-sharing plan as an asset
subject to equitable distribution. 93
The court dismissed as speculative the question of the tax
consequences which might result if it became desirable to liquidate
the profit-sharing fund.
94
One treatise writer in commenting upon treatment of pension
and profit-sharing plans has observed:
Courts have had occasion to consider the eligibility of
interest in these plans for distribution in several reported
cases. The general rule which has emerged is that
interests in such plans are eligible for distribution if they
are not subject to a contingency and are non-forfeitable.
If the only condition precedent to the interest holder's
enjoyment of the plan benefits is his decision as to when
he will reduce his interest to possession, the property is
eligible for distribution. On the other hand, if interests in
such plans constitute a mere expectancy of future benefits
or are subject to a contingency, then they are not the kind
of property which has been acquired during the marriage
such as to be available for distribution, in that there is no
fixed right to present or future enjoyment. 95
4. Other Assets Subject to Distribution
A partnership interest in a law practice has been held to be an
asset subject to equitable distribution, 96 as well as an attorney's
interest in a professional corporation, 97 and even the good will of
the practice of a sole practitioner, despite the ethical non-salability
of the law practice. 98
In California, under its community property law, measurable
good will has been found in a dentist's individual practice, 99 in a
medical practice,' 00  and in a continuing law practice. 101 In
93. Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1978).
94. Id at 561.
95. Finerty, Equitable Distribution Upon Divorce, 2 N..J. PRAC., Ch. 51A, § 1339 at 239 (Supp.
1978).
96. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, __ 331 A.2d 257, 261 (1975).
97. Grayer v. Grayer, 147 N.J. Super. 513, 371 A.2d 753 (App. Div. 1977).
98. Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 530, 397 A.2d 374 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
99. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App.2d 245, -, 301 P.2d 90, 97 (1956).
100. In re Marriage ofFoster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, __, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 50 (1974).
101. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, -, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974). See
generally Note, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 186(1975).
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Washington, under its community property law, measurable good
will has been found in an osteopath's practice. 102 These community
property decisions are persuasive authority in common-law
equitable distribution jurisdictions, which have been arriving at
similar conclusions.
A spouse's chose in action for personal injuries and the other
spouse's per quod claim respecting loss of consortium have been held
to constitute property subject to equitable distribution. 10 3 Such
claims have also been deemed community property under
community property statutes. 104
An unliquidated workmen's compensation claim which arose
during coverture has been held subject to equitable distribution on
divorce, this claim being viewed in the same nature as a chose in
action for personal injuries. 105
A stock option acquired during marriage has been held to be
an asset subject to equitable distribution, despite the contention
that the options do not constitute property but simply a right to
acquire an asset in the future. 106 An interest in a trust has recently
been held subject to equitable distribution on divorce.10 7
The assets which have been discussed thus far are, of course,
by no means all of the assets that can and have been identified and
included as being subject to equitable distribution. Such a list
would be limitless. The foregoing assets, however, have been
receiving the most attention in recent years.
III. VALUATION OF ASSETS
Once the task of identification of the assets subject to equitable
distribution has been completed, the often more difficult task of
valuation must be undertaken. Valuation questions frequently
arise with regard to residential and business real estate. Real estate
appraisals are relatively easy to obtain from qualified appraisers
whose expert opinions will be respected by the court. 0 8 Personal
102. In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, -_, 558 P.2d 279, 283 (1976).
103. Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super.'72, -, 328 A.2d 625, 628 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974).
104. Tinker v. Hobbs, 80 Ariz. 166, -, 294 P.2d 659, 660-61 (1956); Carver v. Ferguson,
254 P.2d 44 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1953). It should be noted that there is a minority view in
community property states, some of which hold that damages for personal injuries are separate
property. See Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, -. , 245 P.2d 826, 832 (1952).
105. Hughes v. Hughes. 132 N.J. Super. 559.. 334A.2d 379, 381 (Super. Ct. Chan. Div.
1975).
106. Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J. Super. 325, _ 361 A.2d 561, 563 (Super, Ct. Chan.
Div. 1976).
107. Mev. Mey, 79 N.J. 122,__,.398A.2d 88, 89-90(1979).
108. See Brown, Puttinga Valueon RealEstate, 2 FAM. ADvoc. 28(1979).
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property appraisals are not as easy to obtain. 0 9 The personal
property appraisers that are available are not likely to be certified
specialists, because no generally recognized or required cer-
tification organizations exist in many fields. Nonetheless, it is
sometimes very important to obtain appraisals of personal property
such as art works and antiques, furniture, gun collections, and coin
collections. As one commentator has stated,
[Mlany times, valid claims to an equitable division of the
artwork and antiques are dismissed as petty quibbling
and relegated to the importance given allocation of the
color television or the stereo. But art and antiques,
although not liquid assets, can be every bit as valuable as
stocks and bonds, and may appreciate even faster than
real estate. I 10
Other assets that may require expert valuation are farm and
ranch property, 11 oil and gas interests, 12 insurance, 1 13 education,
and professional goodwill. 114
Valuation of shares of stock in a closely held corporation is a
very difficult, but often essential element of trial preparation. 115 As
one authority stated,
Valuation of stock in a closely held company is an
attempt to determine the fair market value of an asset
which by definition does not have a fair market value,
since a market wherein a willing buyer will meet a willing
seller, neither under any compulsion, generally does not
exist. The stock of a closely-held corporation is as a rule
offered only under unusual circumstances. The number
of prospects is usually extremely limited. "16
The recommended approach to valuation of the assets of a
closely held corporation is to follow the procedure used to value
these assets for federal estate and gift tax purposes. According to
Revenue Ruling 59-60 the following factors should be included in
109. Seejersin, Puttinga Value on: Personal Property, Id. at 14.
110. See Biederman, Putting a Value on: Art& Antiques, Id. at 19.
111. See Ford, Putting a Value on: Farm &Ranch Property, Id. at 22.
112. See Walker, Putting a Value on: Oil& Gas, Id. at 6 .
113. See Munson, Puttinga Value on: Insurance Policies, Id. at 10.
114. See Kennedy & Thomas, Puttinga valueon: Education & Goodwill, Id. at 2.
115. See Perocci & Walsh, Putting a Value on: Closely Held Corporations, Id. at 32.
116. See Tierney, A New Approach to the Valuation of Common Stock of Closely Held Companies, 17.
*J. TAX. 14(July 1962).
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the valuation procedure:
(a) the nature of the business and the history of the enterprise
from its inception;
(b) the economic outlook in general as well as the condition
and outlook of the specific industry in particular;
(c) the book value of the stock and the financial condition of
the business;
(d) the earning capacity of the company;
(e) the dividend-paying capacity;
(f) whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other
intangible values;
(g) sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be
valued;
(h) the market price of stocks of corporations engaged in a
similar business having their stocks actively traded in a free and
open market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter. 117
Either a certified public accountant or other qualified business
appraiser should be entrusted with valuation of the shares in a
closely held corporation. Accountants and other business
appraisers have developed a new specialty in the seventies as expert
witnesses on equitable distribution and Revenue Ruling 59-60 can
be very helpful for those who are new to this role.
Although the appraiser will undoubtedly be aware of the
general propositions of Revenue Ruling 59-60, he may overlook
some factors unless they are all specifically brought to his attention.
Thus, Revenue Ruling 59-60 should be brought to the accountant's
attention to enable him to do the required valuation.
The valuation of a pension fund was considered in the
Wisconsin case of Selchert v. Selchert, 118 which involved a
noncontributory pension fund. The trial court accepted the opinion
of the wife's expert witness that the value of the pension fund was
equivalent to the purchase price of an annuity by a person the age
of the husband. 119 This was reversed on appeal. In Selchert, the
court summarized an earlier Wisconsin Supreme Court discussion
of the pension valuation problem. 120 In that earlier case the,
Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested the following three methods
of valuation: (1) to consider the amount of the husband's
contributions to the fund and to divide this amount equitably; (2) to
117. Rev. Rul. 59-60, C.B. 1959-1, 237. For a detailed analysis of these elements see Lavene v.
Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 392 A.2d 621 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
118. 90 Wis. 2d 1,280 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1979). See also Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J.
Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
119. Selchert v. Selchert, 90 Wis. 2d 1, -, 280 N.W.2d 293. 296 (Ct. App. 1979).
120. Bloomersv. Bloomer. 84 Wis. 2(1 124. 135-36, 267 N.W.2d 235, 240 (1978).
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attempt to calculate the present value of retirement benefits when
they vest under the plan; and (3) to determine first what percentage
of the marital property each spouse is to receive and then to divide
payments from the pension plan accordingly. 121 Under the widely
used third method it is not necessary to value the pension fund
itself.
The valuation of a spouse's interest in a joint venture in real
estate has been considered recently by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. In Johnson v. Johnson, 122 the court stated as follows:
Valuation of a partner's or joint venturer's interest
for the purpose of a division of property in a marriage
dissolution is approached in the same manner as
valuation of a withdrawing partner's interest. . . or
valuation of a partner's interest upon dissolution of the
partnership in accordance with applicable statutory
provisions .... The partner's capital account in full is an
additional, separate asset to be included in the divisions
of property. 12
3
Another important valuation question has to do with the date
for valuation. There may be a substantial difference in particular
assets, depending on the valuation date, just as there may be a
substantial difference in the value of an estate for federal
inheritance tax purposes between the date of death and the
alternate valuation date six months later. Although the Ruff-Fischer
guidelines that the North Dakota courts apply to decide whether a
distribution is equitable do not refer to a date for valuation of
assets, recent decisions appear to value assets as of the date of the
trial. 124 When considering publicly traded stocks or municipal
bonds or other assets which may have substantially different values
depending on the date of valuation, it may be important to argue
for some alternate date of valuation.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the preceding discussion has shed some light
on the identification and valuation of asset issues that are being
12. ld.
122.'-Minn.-, 227 N.W.2d 208 (1979).
123.,Johnson v.Johnson, -Minn.. , 277 N.W.2d 208, 213 (1979).
124. See Hultberg v. Hultberg, 281 N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1979); Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651
(N.D. 1979); Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1978).
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considered by courts in North Dakota and in other parts of the
country. There are significant differences among common-law
equitable distribution, common-law title, and community property
jurisdictions in the division of assets on divorce. There are,
however, some substantial similarities. Moreover, continuing
cross-fertilization and borrowing between these three categories of
jurisdictions is taking place, as can be noted in the cases referred to
in this article. Thus, although the dream of a uniform divorce law,
which was the first goal of the National Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and a major objective of the much debated and little
adopted 1973 Uniform Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,
has not been realized, there is continued progress toward a consen-
sus of end results in identification and valuation of assets subject to
equitable distribution.
